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To study the role of home production in life—cycle behavior, this paper creates a 
theoretical model in which both spouses in a couple allocate their time between market 
and home work. It then derives a pair of regression equations for estimating the 
parameters of the model, and it carries out the estimation using panel data on household 
net worth and lifetime earnings from the Health and Retirement Study and pseudo—panel 
data on household consumption expenditures from the Consumer Expenditure Survey. 
We estimate that the value of forgone home production is roughly 10-15 cents for every 
dollar that a married man earns, but 30-35 cents per dollar of married women’s market 
earnings. Our findings imply male labor supply elasticities that are very near zero and 
female elasticities in the range of 0.50. Our model predicts a substantial decline in 
measured consumption expenditure at a household’s retirement, and it shows that Euler—















 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Although home production of child care, cooking, residence maintenance, etc., is a
potentially signiﬁcant part of total economic activity, conventional surveys seldom try to
measure its value – nor do the National Income and Product Accounts endeavor to do so.
Some analyses propose to circumvent the lack of measurements by valuing a household’s
entire time budget at market wages rates. A person’s current wage may, however, fail
to provide a good indication of the average value of his or her time. The present paper
attempts a new evaluation of home production, including comparison of men’s and women’s
contributions, as follows: it develops a dynamic, theoretical life—cycle framework in which
both spouses in a couple allocate their time between market and home production, with the
costs and beneﬁts of diﬀerent allocations explicitly speciﬁed; on the basis of the theoretical
framework, it derives regression equations for estimating the parameters of the model; and,
it then carries out the estimation using microeconomic data on household net worth and
lifetime earnings from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and data on household
consumption expenditure from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).
Recent work by House, Laitner, and Stolyarov (HLS) [2006] employs HRS data to
t r yt oq u a n t i f yt h ev a l u eo fh o m ep r o d u c t i o nt hat married households lost in the course
of recent increases in female labor force participation. HLS argue that a “traditional”
household in which the male works in the market and the female works at home would
have more “real income” than a “modern” household with the same market earnings but
with both spouses participating in the labor market. The intuitive idea is that as a woman
participates in the labor market, her household loses her corresponding hours of home
production. HLS attempt to quantify the value of the loss indirectly, using HRS data
on household net worth at retirement. In their formulation, all households have full-time
home production after retirement, but a household that sacriﬁc e dh o m ep r o d u c t i o np r i o rt o
retirement should have a lower standard of living relative to its measured, market earnings
and, hence, should have saved less for retirement in proportion to its measured lifetime
wage and salary income.
While HLS assume that men work in the market full time prior to retirement, the
present paper adopts a more symmetric setting in which both men and women divide their
time between market and home production. With the new model, one could, in principle,
estimate the value of forgone home production for both sexes from the data in HLS. We
show this below. Such an approach, however, places very heavy demands on the net worth
and earnings data – and, in practice, large standard errors emerge. The present paper
develops a two—equation formulation for statistical analysis, which brings expenditure data
from the CEX into the analysis.
This paper generalizes the theoretical framework of HLS [2006]. The new model
determines one regression equation that, as before, relates a household’s net worth to its
lifetime market earnings. As in HLS, we utilize HRS lifetime data on individual households
to estimate this equation. One of the unusual str e n g t h so ft h eH R Si si t si n c l u s i o no fS o c i a l
Security—record measurements of annual earnings for both men and women. Although this
data does not report work hours, our analysis (like that of HLS), surprisingly, does not
require such information.
Our theoretical model also determines a second equation for statistical analysis. The
1new condition relates a household’s market expenditures in one year to those in the next.
Consumption expenditure has been comparatively diﬃcult for surveys to measure, and
the BLS Consumer Expenditure Survey has provided virtually the only comprehensive
disaggregative data. Nevertheless, by construction, the CEX does not provide observations
on individual households. However, the CEX sample is so large that we can extract average
consumption for married households of individual ages, for individual years. This paper
uses the CEX data to construct a pseudo panel – i.e., to construct measures of changes
in expenditure between an average household of age s at time t a n da na v e r a g eh o u s e h o l d
at age s+1inyeart+1, where the latter (average) household represents a one—year—older
version of the ﬁrst. We estimate our two equations simultaneously, taking into account
cross—equation parameter restrictions from the theory.
Our results suggest that the value of forgone male home production is roughly 15 cents
per dollar of male earnings, while the value of forgone home production per dollar of female
earnings is 30-35 cents. Our ﬁndings add support to the original estimates of the value of
forgone home production in HLS, though the new estimates are somewhat higher. They
show that male losses per dollar of earnings are noticeably smaller. Moreover, the estimates
imply that total household expenditures on replacements for lost home production are large
in aggregate. In terms of the well—being of older citizens, our results suggest that simple
comparisons of income ﬂows before and after retirement can be misleading – because
retirees have much more time for home production.
Our results also enable us to estimate male and female labor supply elasticities. The fe-
male elasticity is appreciably larger than the male. Existing papers suggest that home pro-
duction may be an important element in explaining changes in employment over the busi-
ness cycle (e.g., Rupert et al. [1995] McGrattan et al. [1997], and Benhabib et al. [1991]),
for example, and our elasticity estimates mayb ea b l et oc o n t r i b u t et ot h el i t e r a t u r e .
Since the majority of males work standard hours until retirement, our empirical anal-
ysis of men relies on comparing household expenditures from ages before retirement to
ages after. A number of recent studies ﬁnd signiﬁcant drops in household expenditure at,
and after, retirement (e.g., Banks et al. [1998], Bernheim et al. [2001], Hurd and Rohwed-
der [2003], Laitner and Silverman [2005], and Aguiar and Hurst [2005]). The literature
considers a number of possible explanations: insuﬃcient household preparation for retire-
ment (e.g., Bernheim et al.), smoothing of service ﬂows from consumption and leisure
after expansion of the latter upon retirement (e.g., Laitner and Silverman), and greater
availability of time for home production after retirement (e.g., Augiar and Hurst). The
present paper has the most in common with the last hypothesis. Our model predicts a
decline in expenditures upon retirement. Indeed, it assumes that any decline observable in
the data stems from opportunities after retirement for males and females to expand their
home production. The apparent plausibility of our parameter estimates conditional on this
assumption may be deemed to support the assumption. What is more, we hope that the
explicit grounding of our analysis in economic theory will suggest avenues in the future
for testing the relative importance of competing explanations for household expenditure
changes at retirement.
The second equation in our statistical speciﬁcation has a familiar form – namely,
it is a microeconomic version of the well—known Euler equation of Hall [1978] and many
2others (e.g., Hansen and Singleton [1982]). Our speciﬁcation diﬀers from most in the
existing literature. In particular, our model distinguishes between market expenditures
on consumption goods (and services) and total consumption, with the latter additionally
including home production. The distinction leads to a statistical model with male and
female earnings terms, which are atypical for the literature, as well as market expenditure
terms, which are standard.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents our basic model.
Section 3 describes our data. Sections 4-5 present the empirical analysis and interpret the
results. Section 6 concludes.
2M o d e l
We consider a life—cycle model of a dual—earner household. The household can produce
a home good with male and/or female time and can also purchase market goods, and mar-
ket goods can substitute for home good. The model’s basic structure follows HLS [2006];
however, the present paper extends home—production options to males as well as females.
Each household seeks to maximize its discounted lifetime utility. For household i,l e t
hm
is be male market hours at (household) age s and wm
is the net—of—tax market wage, let
h
f
is be female market hours at (household) age s and w
f
is the female’s net—of—tax wage, let
xis be market expenditure, let Nis be number of “equivalent adults” (see below), let Si be
household’s the starting age, let T be its terminal age, let r be the net—of—tax real interest
rate, let ais be household net worth (i.e., “assets”), and let cis be household “consumption”
at age s.L e t Ri be the household’s retirement age, assume spouses retire together, and






























is − xis , (3)




is = 0 all s ≥ Ri . (5)
W h e nt h em a l eo rf e m a l es p o u s ew o r k shm or hf hours in the market, output of
t h eh o m eg o o di sr e d u c e db yAm · [hm]ξ
m
and Af · [hf]ξ
f
, respectively. This paper’s
formulation assumes that the home good is essential for household operation; consequently,
a household must purchase market—good replacements for all reductions in home—good
1 HLS [2006] show that exogeneity for Ri is, in general, inessential. See Gustman and
Steinmeier [2000] for evidence that couples tend to retire together in practice.
3output. Household “consumption,” cis, the argument in the household’s utility function,
equals expenditure, xis, net of the cost of market goods that substitute for lost home—good
output,
Af · [hf]ξf
+ Am · [hm]ξm
.
Our treatment of men and women is symmetric; however, we allow arbitrary variation
in home productivity – i.e., A
f
is and Am
is can diﬀer across households, across time, and
between sexes. This paper assumes that the marginal cost of forgone home production is
increasing; therefore, we assume
ξm > 1a n dξf > 1. (6)
Because females exhibit much longer hours of home production in practice, one might
expect
ξm > ξf . (7)
Household i lives from age Si to T, and both men and women retire at exogenously
speciﬁed household age Ri <T . A household knows these ages with certainty. As is
familiar in the literature, this paper takes u(.) to be isoelastic:
u(c)=
F 1
γ · cγ , for γ < 1a n dγ  =0,
ln(c), for γ =0 .
We follow Tobin [1967] (and HLS) in constructing the measure of a household’s “equivalent
adult” membership as
Nis =1+αS · χS(is)+αK · χK(is), (8)
where χS(is) is 1 if the household has a spouse present at age s and 0 otherwise, χK(is)
gives the number of children (i.e., “kids”) present, and αS and αK are parameters.
The following two propositions summarize the implications of optimizing behavior:






is,a n dr are continuous everywhere




is,a n dcis be the optimal solution to (1)-(5).
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Proposition 2. Let retirement age Ri be given. Then for any s ≥ Ri, solution of (1)-(5)
implies
ais
(1 − θm) · Y m





s Nit · σt−s dt
$ T






1−γ , θm ≡
1




















An interpretation of Proposition 1 is as follows. Both men and women face time—
allocation decisions at all ages prior to retirement. As men, for example, equate the














The right—hand expression is equation (9). Similarly for (10). Condition (11) is a well—
known implication of the isoelastic utility function: consumption should grow at a constant
rate, faster for a higher interest rate, slower for a higher rate of subjective impatience.
T u r n i n gt oP r o p o s i t i o n2 ,t h eh ousehold budget constraint implies that after retire-




Nis · cis · e−r·(t−s) dt any s ≥ Ri . (15)
The same accounting implies that over a household’s entire life span, the present value of
earnings must cover expenditures, which, through (2), include consumption and replace-






















e−r·(t−s) · cit dt. (16)
Proposition 1 shows that the lifetime value of lost home production is proportional to







dt = θm · Y m
is .
And, similarly for females. Equations (15)-(16) determine the numerators and denomina-
tors of (13) – after one substitutes from (11).
Propositions 1-2 determine our two estimation conditions. The ﬁrst resembles the sole
estimation condition from HLS. Deﬁne ¯ θ from




Then separating ais by itself on the left—hand side of (13), taking logarithms, and append-
ing an error term  1
is,o n eh a s
ln(ais)=l n ( 1− θm)+l n
D
Y m

















Focus, for a moment, on the error term. Assets and debts are diﬃcult to capture
precisely on a survey; so,  1
is reﬂects measurement error in ais. If the latter errors are
lognormally distributed,  1
is is normal; and, E[ 1
is] = 0 if the (log) survey data are unbiased.
Beyond this, we worry that asset prices rose precipitously in the late 1990s, and fell
thereafter – all for reasons beyond the scope of this paper’s model. Rather than resort
to a very elaborate components—of—error structure for  1 with separate, aggregative time
eﬀects, we introduce time—dummy variables into (18). Our HRS data (see below) covers
1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. Let
Dv(is)=
+
1i f s = v,
0o t h e r w i s e .
Let δ1
v be the coeﬃcient on Dv. Assume that the new dummies make no diﬀerence to









v · [Dv(is) − D2000(is)]
on the right—hand side of (18).
Finally, since our HRS data forms a panel with observations for 1-6 waves for each
household i,w em o d e lt h er e s i d u a le r r o ri n( 1 8 )w i t h
6μi + ηis ,
where μi is a random eﬀect peculiar to household i – possibly reﬂecting household idiosyn-
cracies not otherwise captured by our model – and ηis is purely random. The condition
that this paper actually estimates is then
q1
is(  β ,   δ1) ≡ ln(ais) − {β1 +l n
D
Y m



















v · [Dv(is) − D2000(is)]} =
μi + ηis , (19)
where
  β ≡ (β1 , β2 , β3) ≡ (ln(1 − θm), ¯ θ, σ), (20)
and





Our second estimation condition, which is new to this paper, comes from equation (11)













































The CEX (described below) collects data on household expenditures. Survey observations
on individual households are not available (even in principle); however, we can derive
weighted averages for married couples by (st)—cell, where the cells represent U.S. population





ωist · xist .
7Think of s as being the male’s age. Rather than trusting CEX earnings data (the CEX
is, after all, primarily an expenditure survey), we turn to the March Current Population
Surveys for 1984-2002. From earnings for married men and women, classiﬁed by the man’s





¯ ωjst · ym





¯ ωkst · y
f
kst .
The linearity of (21) allows us to take weighted averages of each of its terms, giving
¯ xs+1,t+1 −
1




ξm · ¯ ym
s+1,t+1 = σ · er · [¯ xst −
1




ξm · ¯ ym
st].
The CEX and CPS provide data on ¯ x,¯ yf,a n d¯ ym. Noticing that knowledge of   β ≡
(β1 , β2 , β3) determines θf via (17), deﬁne
gst(  β) ≡ ¯ xs+1,t+1 −
1




ξm · ¯ ym
s+1,t+1−
σ · er · [¯ xst −
1




ξm · ¯ ym
st]. (22)
Then our second estimation condition is
gst(  β)= 2
st , (23)
with  2
st ar a n d o me r r o rw i t hm e a n0 .
Turn to  2
st. Because expenditures on consumption goods and services are probably
more diﬃcult to measure than household net worth, we continue to be concerned with
measurement error. Although the asset bubble of the late 1990s is perhaps less of an issue
for (23) than for (19), Hall [1978] calls attention to the possibility that unforeseen events
force households to adjust their consumption permanently from time to time. Hence, to
simplify  2, we again consider a system of dummy variables. Since our expenditure data
covers each year 1984-2002, (22) uses diﬀerences for t =1 9 8 4 ,...,2001; thus, our new




v · [Dv(st) − D2000(st)].
Because (23) has expenditure terms for (s+1,t+1)and(st), our complete speciﬁcation is
q2




v · [Dv(st) − D2000(st)] =
υs+1,t+1 − σ · er · υst , (24)
where each υ is white noise with mean 0.
83D a t a
This paper uses data from three sources. First, we use data on earnings and net
worth at retirement for individual households from the Health and Retirement Study. Our
other two data sources are the Current Population Survey and the Consumer Expendi-
ture Survey. These surveys provide cross—sectional data on individuals’ earnings and on
households’ consumption expenditures.
We estimate (19) from the HRS. HLS [2006] describe this data in detail. It has linked
Social Security—record earnings histories – see Section 1. We correct for missing em-
ployer beneﬁts by multiplying each year’s earnings by the year’s ratio of NIPA “total labor
compensation” to NIPA “wages and salaries.” We subtract personal income taxes at a pro-
portional rate equaling the year’s average rate. We derive the latter from NIPA “personal
current taxes” divided by NIPA “personal income” plus “contributions for government
social insurance” less one—half of transfers received.2 We assume that one—half of Social
Security beneﬁts are subject to the income tax. We also subtract OASDI taxes at the
statutory rate for each year, assessing the tax up to the year’s cap. In all cases, we deﬂate
with the NIPA PCE deﬂator. We assign household Social Security beneﬁts according to
the statutory formulas, by year. Our net worthv a r i a b l ec o r r e s p o n d st ot h es a m ei nH L S .
We estimate (24) from the other two data sets.
The CEX provides data on market expenditures x, as well as corresponding demo-
graphic information on households. Let s be a the male respondent’s age and t the current
date. Then the CEX provides observations on ¯ xst described in the preceding section. With
SAS software provided by BLS, we are able to derive ¯ xst for all couples of age s at time t,
and for married couples alone.
The CEX covers consumption categories closely corresponding to National Income and
P r o d u c tA c c o u n t s( N I P A )p e r s o n a lc o n s u m p t i on expenditures (PCE). Following Laitner
and Silverman [2005], we assume that totals in the NIPA are correct and adjust the CEX
data to match. The adjustments are as follows. First, we exclude pension contributions and
life-insurance contributions from the CEX. Then we subdivide both NIPA PCE and the
CEX data into eleven expenditure categories: (1) food, (2) apparel, (3) personal care, (4)
shelter, (5) household operations, (6) transportation, (7) medical, (8) entertainment, (9)
education, (10) personal business, and (11) miscellaneous. For each year, we scale the CEX
composite data for all households to match category by category the NIPA consumption
data. We then apply the category adjustments one—by—one to the individual age cells of
the CEX data for married couples.
Second, we adjust the CEX “shelter” category. For “own dwelling,” the CEX measure
of expenditure is mortgage payments, maintenance, etc. The CEX separately measures
t h em a r k e tv a l u eo ft h eh o u s e ,h o w e v e r .W er e p l a c et h eC E X“ o w nd w e l l i n g ”c o m p o n e n t
of “shelter” for couples, age—by—age, with the CEX value of own house multiplied by the
factor that in aggregate makes the CEX service ﬂow, for all households (of all ages), equal
to the NIPA ﬂow from own houses for the same year.
Third, we adjust the CEX “personal business” category. NIPA “personal business”
consumption includes bank and brokerage fees, many of which are hidden in the form of
2 This paper’s treatment of income taxes diﬀers from HLS [2006].
9low interest rates on checking accounts, etc., and hence do not appear in CEX survey
responses from households. Assuming that all bank and brokerage fees make their way
into our life—cycle model through lower interest rates on savings, we drop them from the
NIPA data, and we drop more limited measures of the same from the CEX data. We then
adjust the remainder of “personal business” spending in the CEX for all households to
match the corresponding remainder in the NIPA, carrying the adjustment factor to the
CEX data for couples.
Our ﬁnal adjustment applies to “medical” spending. The CEX data, because it is
based on a survey of households, omits both employer contributions to health insurance
and governmental Medicare and Medicaid spending. As a result, the CEX captures a
particularly small share of NIPA medical spending. So, we drop the CEX medical spending
and use an alternative measure. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
provides information on personal health care expenditures by age.3 Speciﬁcally, for the
years 1987, 1996, and 1999, the CMS provides total health spending, and per capita health
care spending, for 7 age groups. (The totals in the CMS data reﬂect the NIPA medical
spending component of PCE quite well.) We linearly interpolate and extrapolate the
totals and per capital ﬁgures to all years 1984-2002. We then justify the annual totals to
amounts in the NIPA. Next, after carrying the latter adjustment proportionately to per
capita amounts, we year—by—year interpolate and extrapolate the per capita ﬁgures to the
individuals in our CEX couples data. Assuming wives are two years younger than their
husbands, we then impute couples’ medical spending to each CEX age—year cell.
The adjusted CEX consumption data serves as our data on market expenditures. We
deﬂate the ﬁnal consumption data with the NIPA PCE deﬂator (normalized to 1 in 2000).
As stated, we use earnings data come from the Current Population Survey (CPS). We
restrict our attention to two-member households that are married couples living together.4
The CPS provides annual earnings data for husbands and their wives. As above, we deﬁne
a household’s age to be the husband’s age. We correct for missing beneﬁts and taxes as
with the HRS data. We deﬂa t ew i t ht h eN I P AP C Ed e ﬂator (normalized to 1 in 2000).
Using CPS weights, this generates our variables ¯ ym
st and ¯ y
f
st.
Changes in family composition for young households present complications for our
analysis (due to varying Nis). To minimize these, we limit our attention to the subsample
of CEX and CPS households between the age of 55 and 69. For this group, children are
less important; moreover, older people who are married are likely to remain so. We have
CEX and CPS cross sections for 1984-2002.
Finally, we assume a real interest rate of 5 percent per year.5 To derive our variable
r, we subtract incomes taxes at a constant average rate of 0.1169 – which is the long—run
average of our personal current tax rate above.
3 Public access to this data is available through the CMS web site
www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHeathExpendData.
4 This contrasts slightly with the CEX data described above, which includes all couples.
5 See the discussion in Laitner and Silverman [2005].
104 Estimation
This section describes our estimation steps and outcomes. We use the notation q1
is
and q2
st from Section 3; let q1 be the vector of the former for all is,a n d ,s i m i l a r l y ,l e tq2
be the vector with elements q2
st all st.L e t  p be the vector of parameters to be estimated,
including, at most,   β,   δ1,a n d  δ2.
HLS [2006] estimate (19) alone, using NLLS with White standard errors. Since this
paper’s estimation procedure is diﬀerent, and since we have computed taxes on a diﬀerent
(i.e., a yearly) basis, for the sake of comparison, we begin with new, single—equation results.
Table 1 presents outcomes based on (19) by itself. We use a two—stage estimation
procedure. The ﬁrst generates consistent point estimates of β1, β2, β3,a n dδ1
v.I nt h ec a s e
of (19), stage-1 uses NLLS. From the residuals, we estimate σ2
μ and σ2
η (e.g., Greene [1990,
p. 490-491]). Throughout this paper, stage-1 estimates of σ2
μ/(σ2
μ + σ2
η) are always about
0.25. We form a matrix Ω1 with ni×ni submatrices along its principal diagonal (and zeros
elsewhere), where ni is the number of HRS observations for household i,a n dw h e r ee a c h
submatrix has 1 along its principal diagonal and σ2
μ/(σ2
μ + σ2
η)e l s e w h e r e . 6 In this case,
  p =(   β ,   δ1). We form a matrix of instruments Z1, with one row for each observation, and



















with each partial derivative evaluated at the stage—1 consistent parameters estimates, say,
  p1.














1 · [Ω1]−1 · q1(  p)
i
. (25)
Letting Q1 be the matrix whose rows are the partial derivatives of q1 with respect to each
element of the parameter vector in turn, Gallant [1987] shows the covariance matrix for
our second—stage parameter—vector estimate, say,  p,i s
C = σ11(  p1) ·
JD
QT










1 ·[Ω1]−1 ·Q1( p)
io−1
, (26)
where if n is the number of observations and p the number of elements in   p1,
σ11(  p1) ≡ qT
1 (  p1) · [Ω1]−1 · q1(  p1)/(n − p).
Table 1 presents stage-2 parameter estimates. In HLS [2006], θm = 0 by assumption,
and θf = θ. In this case, Table 1 shows that households require about 25 cents worth of
market goods to substitute for the lost home production implicit in each dollar’s worth of
female market earnings.
6 Notice that the stage—1 estimates are consistent. We do not re—estimate Ω1 in stage
2.
11Table 1. Estimated Coeﬃcients Single—Equation Model:
Estimated Parameter (Std. Error/T Stat.)
Speciﬁcation:
Para—
metersa αS =0 .50; αS =0 .50; αS =0 .50;
αK =0 .00 αK =0 .15 αK =0 .50
0.1371 0.1042 0.0459
θM (0.2573/0.3244) (0.2640/0.4223) (0.2647/0.5466)
0.2576∗∗ 0.2567∗∗ 0.2567∗∗
θ (0.1220/2.0400) (0.1221/2.0385) (0.1223/2.0412)
0.9812∗∗∗ 0.9798∗∗∗ 0.9777∗∗∗
σ (0.0104/93.4028) (0.0101/95.9510) (0.0093/104.5581)
Sample Size:
Observations 954 954 954
Households 441 441 441
Signiﬁcant at: 10% level (*), 5% level (**), 1% level (***).
a. Year dummies not reported.
As in Section 2, we can interpret row 1 of Table 1 as estimating θm (as shown) and
deduce an estimate of θf from (17). The magnitude of the estimates of θm in the three
columns may be plausible, yet the estimates, unfortunately, are imprecise – having large
standard errors. Our hope is that our 2—equation speciﬁcation can do better. Indeed, we
believe that it does.
To estimate stage—1 for the 2—equation statistical formulation, run the ﬁrst stage for
(19) as above – treating β1 as an unrestricted constant. NLLS can, as is well—known, be
viewed as a method of moments procedure, solving
min
  β ,   δ1
D
qT





1 (  β ,   δ1) · q1(  β ,   δ1)
i
.
Form matrix Z2 of instruments for (24) with rows
D
1,D 1984(st) − D2000(st),. . .,D 1999(st) − D2000(st),D 2001(st) − D2000(st)
i
.
Fixing equation (19) stage—1 estimates of σ and θ, obtain stage—1 estimates of θm and   δ2
from
min
θm ,   δ2
D
qT





2 · q2(θm ,   δ2)
i
,
12w h e r ew ec o n s t r a i nθf with
θf =1− (1 − θ) · (1 − θm)
(recall (17)). Following the preceding discussion and Section 3, form the matrix Ω2 with
nj × nj submatrices along the principal diagonal (and zeros elsewhere), where nj is the
number of years length for CEX pseudo panel j, and where each submatrix has 1 along its
principal diagonal and
−
σ · er · σ2
υ
σ2




1+[ σ]2 · e2·r (27)
for the diagonals immediately above and below the principal one. We use the stage—1
estimate of σ in the construction of Ω2,a n dﬁx Ω2 thereafter.7
For stage 2, this paper considers 3 speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst allows an arbitrary constant
in (19); so,
  p =( β1 , θ, θm , σ,   δ1 ,   δ2).
The second sets β1 =l n ( 1− θm); hence, the preceding   p loses its ﬁrst element. The
third speciﬁcation adds two additional instruments for (24), ym
st and y
f
st. The latter then































2 · [Ω2]−1 · q2(  p)
i
/σ22(  p1)}. (28)
Setting Q2(  p) analogously to the way we set Q1(  p) above, the covariance matrix for the
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7 In fact, the estimate of (27) is almost exactly -0.50 in all cases, and the ratio of




st] for the calculations in Tables 2-4
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.
Tables 2-4 present the second—stage estimates from the two—equation formulation.
Our family—composition weights (recall (8)) follow the Social Security system in setting
αS =0 .50. This also agrees with the estimates in Laitner and Silverman [2005]. The Social
Security system’s treatment of orphans implicitly sets αK =0 .50 and, as this paper does,
allows the weight for a maximum of 2 children at a time. Many papers simply impose
αK =0 .00. Laitner and Silverman estimate αK =0 .15. Although tables 2-4 try all three
possibilities for αK, results seem insensitive to one’s choice.
In each case, we began with a complete set of 5 time dummies for (19) and 17 time
dummies for (24). Coeﬃcient estimates for the former dummies always have a methodical
pattern (in particular, they increase through 2000) and always are jointly statistically
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10 percent signiﬁcance level – in fact, at the 5
percent level except for each table’s ﬁr s tc o l u m n . T h et i m ed u m m i e sf o r( 2 4 ) ,o nt h e
other hand, show little discernible pattern and are only jointly statistically signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero (under a Wald test) at the 10 percent level in one of the nine columns.
Out of concern for adequate sample size for the remaining estimates, in the end we drop
the dummies from (24). In terms of Hall’s [1978] model, our pseudo—panel CEX data
present average consumption expenditures; thus, our analysis cannot address the possible
role of idiosyncratic shocks to individual households. In terms of aggregative shocks, 1984-
2002 was not a period with a sharp or prolonged recession. It is also possible that the
measurement errors in our expenditure data simply overwhelm Hall’s error. Future work
will consider formulations with random time eﬀects.
Since columns 2-3 in Tables 2-4 have more instruments than parameters, we present
χ2 tests of the over—identifying restrictions. These tests never reject our speciﬁcation at
even the 20 percent signiﬁcance level.
Tables 2-4 show estimates of θf of 0.30-0.35, which is somewhat larger than the esti-
mate from Table 1 under the assumption, for the latter, that θf = θ.O u re s t i m a t e so fθm
are about half as large, ranging in magnitude, in columns 2-3, of 0.13 to 0.17. In contrast
to Table 1, standard errors for θm are now as small – at least in columns 2-3 – as those
for θf. Table 2-4 estimates of θf are always diﬀerent from 0.0 at the 5 percent signiﬁcance
level, and the estimates of θm are diﬀerent from 0.0 at the 10 percent signiﬁcance level in
column 3. The tables show that a Wald test of θm =0=θf invariably strongly rejects.
A number of economists have argued that policymakers should judge household well—
being on the basis of consumption rather than dollar income (e.g., Hurd and Rohwed-
der [2006]). The present analysis suggests that household expenditures on market goods
and services are, in turn, potentially misleading indicators of overall consumption, be-
cause total consumption includes home production as well. The distinction between total
consumption and market expenditures on goods and services is particularly important
for comparisons of households before and after retirement. Tables 2-4 show that a mar-
ried household’s gains in home production at retirement may amount to 15 percent of a
husband’s pre—retirement earnings and 30 percent of the same for his wife.
14Table 2. Estimated Coeﬃcients Two—Equation Model: αS =0 .5 and αK =0 .00
Estimated Parameter (Std. Error/T Stat.)
Speciﬁcation:
Para—
metersa Separate EQ1-Constant EQ1-Constant=
Constant EQ1 Constrained ln(1 − θm);
to Equal Added Instruments
ln(1 − θm) ¯ ym
st and ¯ y
f
st
EQ1 -0.1474 NA NA
Constant (0.2981/-0.4945)
0.2576∗∗ 0.2577∗∗ 0.1940
θ (0.1220/2.1117) (0.1220/2.1129) (0.1213/1.5996)
0.1396 0.1444 0.1682∗
θm (0.1831/0.7623) (0.0944/1.5292) (0.0920/1.8291)
0.9812∗∗∗ 0.9814∗∗∗ 0.9822∗∗∗
σ (0.0104/94.1357) (0.0044/224.7665) (0.0044/222.6810)
Sample Size: EQ1/EQ2
Observations 954/252 954/252 954/252
Householdsb 441/31 441/31 441/31
Calculated Parameters:c
0.3613∗∗ 0.3649∗∗∗ 0.3296∗∗∗
θf (0.1588/2.2753) (0.1051/3.4720) (0.1062/3.1033)
Wald Test of θm =0=θf: Statistic (P-value)
χ2(2) =7.3322∗∗ χ2(2) =12.1820∗∗∗ χ2(2) =9.9703∗∗∗
(0.9744) (0.9977) (0.9932)
Test of Overidentifying Restrictions: Statistic (P-value)
NA χ2(1) = 0.0009 χ2(3) = 4.4779
(0.0246) (0.7857)
Signiﬁcant at: 10% level (*), 5% level (**), 1% level (***).
a. Year dummies not reported.
b. EQ2 “households” from pseudo—panel.
c. Asymptotic standard error from delta method.Table 3. Estimated Coeﬃcients Two—Equation Model: αS =0 .5 and αK =0 .15
Estimated Parameter (Std. Error/T Stat.)
Speciﬁcation:
Para—
metersa Separate EQ1-Constant EQ1-Constant=
Constant EQ1 Constrained ln(1 − θm);
to Equal Added Instruments
ln(1 − θm) ¯ ym
st and ¯ y
f
st
EQ1 -0.1100 NA NA
Constant (0.2947/-0.3732)
0.2567∗∗ 0.2569∗∗ 0.1927
θ (0.1221/2.1034) (0.1222/2.1012) (0.1214/1.5878)
0.1167 0.1396 0.1630∗
θm (0.1831/0.6372) (0.0938/1.4888) (0.0912/1.7875)
0.9798∗∗∗ 0.9812∗∗∗ 0.9819∗∗∗
σ (0.0101/96.6633) (0.0043/228.3513) (0.0043/226.7019)
Sample Size: EQ1/EQ2
Observations 954/252 954/252 954/252
Householdsb 441/31 441/31 441/31
Calculated Parameters:c
0.3434∗∗ 0.3606∗∗∗ 0.3243∗∗∗
θf (0.1589/2.1612) (0.1050/3.4348) (0.1059/3.0615)
Wald Test of θm =0=θf: Statistic (P-value)
χ2(2) =6.7638∗∗ χ2(2) =11.9372∗∗∗ χ2(2) =9.7307∗∗∗
(0.9660) (0.9974) (0.9923)
Test of Overidentifying Restrictions: Statistic (P-value)
NA χ2(1) = 0.0217 χ2(3) = 4.4941
(0.1172) (0.7872)
Signiﬁcant at: 10% level (*), 5% level (**), 1% level (***).
a. Year dummies not reported.
b. EQ2 “households” from pseudo—panel.
c. Asymptotic standard error from delta method.Table 4. Estimated Coeﬃcients Two—Equation Model: αS =0 .5 and αK =0 .50
Estimated Parameter (Std. Error/T Stat.)
Speciﬁcation:
Para—
metersa Separate EQ1-Constant EQ1-Constant=
Constant EQ1 Constrained ln(1 − θm);
to Equal Added Instruments
ln(1 − θm) ¯ ym
st and ¯ y
f
st
EQ1 -0.0469 NA NA
Constant (0.2774/-0.1692)
0.2567∗∗ 0.2565∗∗ 0.1917
θ (0.1223/2.0999) (0.1223/2.0984) (0.1215/1.5782)
0.0775 0.1304 0.1530∗
θm (0.1760/0.4403) (0.0921/1.4152) (0.0894/1.7114)
0.9777∗∗∗ 0.9807∗∗∗ 0.9814∗∗∗
σ (0.0093/105.2148) (0.0042/236.1722) (0.0042/235.3521)
Sample Size: EQ1/EQ2
Observations 954/252 954/252 954/252
Householdsb 441/31 441/31 441/31
Calculated Parameters:c
0.3143∗∗ 0.3535∗∗∗ 0.3154∗∗∗
θf (0.1555/2.0214) (0.1049/3.3713) (0.1055/2.9886)
Wald Test of θm =0=θf: Statistic (P-value)
χ2(2) =5.9787∗ χ2(2) =11.5304∗∗∗ χ2(2) =9.3246∗∗∗
(0.9497) (0.9969) (0.9906)
Test of Overidentifying Restrictions: Statistic (P-value)
NA χ2(1) = 0.1307 χ2(3) = 4.6060
(0.2823) (0.7970)
Signiﬁcant at: 10% level (*), 5% level (**), 1% level (***).
a. Year dummies not reported.
b. EQ2 “households” from pseudo—panel.
c. Asymptotic standard error from delta method.5I m p l i c a t i o n s
This section discusses implications of Section 4’s outcomes for the elasticity of la-
bor supply, consumption behavior at retirement (including the so—called “consumption
puzzle”), and the literature on “Euler equation” models.
Labor Supply. The magnitude of labor supply elasticities has long been an important
topic in labor economics, public ﬁnance, and macroeconomics. Labor economists usually
argue that elasticities of labor supply for adult males are small, perhaps not much diﬀerent
from zero (e.g., Blundell and MaCurdy [1999]), while female elasticities may be much larger,
perhaps 0.5 or more (e.g., Pencavel [1998]).
Results in Tables 2-4 generate a new set of labor—supply elasticity estimates. Taking






















1 − θf .
In Section 2’s model, these constitute both long—run labor supply elasticities for men and
women (i.e., the percentage response of labor supply with respect to a permanent change
in the wage) and short—run elasticities (i.e., the percentage response of labor supply to
temporary wage changes). Formally, this establishes
Proposition 3. For j = m,f,l e t 
j
LR give the elasticity of the labor supply with respect
to a permanent change in the wage rate, and let  
j
SR give the elasticity with respect to a
momentary change in the wage rate. Then for the model of Section 2,
 
j











1 − θj for j = m,f . (30)
Table 5 uses parameter estimates from Table 3 to derive numerical values of the
elasticities. The so—called delta method yields standard errors and conﬁdence intervals.
Despite large standard errors, Table 5’s elasticity estimates are interesting in a number
of respects. (i) Although our framework of analysis is very diﬀerent from traditional labor—
economics approaches, our point estimates are quite similar to those cited. This might
increase one’s conﬁdence is both methodologies. (ii) Macroeconomists have been intrigued
with the possibility that agents’ responses to short—run wage changes might be larger
than their responses to long—run or permanent changes. The idea would be that following
aw a g ei n c r e a s e ,t h es u b s t i t u t i o ne ﬀect makes an agent want to supply more labor but
t h ei n c o m ee ﬀect increases the agent’s demand for leisure. In the case of a temporary
wage change, the income eﬀect would tend to be greatly diminished or absent. In our
model, agents divide their time between home and market work. They do not withdraw
hours for more leisure. As Proposition 1 shows, lifetime resources do not aﬀect a man or
woman’s time allocation choices. In our context, therefore, a shock to the market wage
leads to a substitution eﬀect – tending to increase labor supply to the market – but no
income eﬀect on overall work hours. The small magnitude of our elasticity estimates is
then somewhat surprising. There is no diﬀerence in size between our elasticities for short
15Table 5. Estimated Labor Elasticities of Supply: αS =0 .5 and αK =0 .15




Constant EQ1 Constrained ln(1 − θm);
to Equal Added Instruments
ln(1 − θm) ¯ ym




Men (0.2347) (0.1267) (0.1302)
[−0.3283, 0.5923] [−0.0863, 0.4108] [−0.0606, 0.4502]
0.5231 0.5640 0.4800
Women (0.3686) (0.2568) (0.2320)
[−0.2001, 1.2463] [0.0601, 1.0679] [0.0247, 0.9353]
a. Parameter values from Table 3.
and long—run wage changes. (iii) Because our estimation is closely tied to a fully speciﬁed
life—cycle model, elaborations are reasonably straightforward, and they could increase the
utility of our results. HLS’s treatment of experiential human capital illustrates this point,
and human capital is a direction in which we want to proceed with this work in the future.
Consumption at Retirement. The “retirement consumption puzzle” refers to the system-
atic reduction in expenditures on market goods and services for households that enter
retirement. A number of recent papers document such a decline for households at, and
after, their retirement age (e.g., Banks et al. [1998], Bernheim et al. [2001], Hurd and
Rohwedder [2003], Laitner and Silverman [2005], and Aguiar and Hurst [2005]). Possi-
ble explanations include reduced work—related expenses after retirement, poor planning,
nonseparability of consumption and leisure, and increased shopping time after retirement.
The model in this paper oﬀers another explanation, perhaps most similar to the shopping—
time theory above. Our model implies that after retirement, lost home production due to
market work ceases, yet lifetime utility maximization requires total consumption to vary
smoothly with age; thus, with fewer home—production losses to oﬀset, households reduce
their expenditure on market goods and services after they retire.
To think about consumption near retirement age in more detail, recall Proposition 1.
Near Ri, family composition may be quite stable, so that Nis is constant. If so, (11) implies
ci,s+∆ = e
r−ρ
1−γ ·∆ · cis . (31)
Let s = Ri = R and ∆ ↓ 0. Then
ci,R+0 → ci,R−0 . (32)






Then (2) and (32) imply









Using Proposition 1 again, this yields


















Proposition 4. Assume that Nis is continuous at s = Ri = R.T h e nu p o nt h er e t i r e m e n t
of household i, its expenditure on market goods and services, xis for s = R,d e c l i n e s
according to










Thus, our model predicts a decline in a household’s expenditures after retirement. In
particular, in view of (33) and Tables 2-4, for couples the magnitude of the decline should
be about 15 percent the size of pre—retirement male earnings plus about 30 percent of
pre—retirement female earnings. Evidently, the model predicts a smaller decline per dollar
of pre—retirement earnings for households relying on male income alone, for households in
which only one spouse retires at s = R, and for households engaging in part—time market
work after age R. For households that abruptly cease all market employment at age R,
Tables 2-4 show the decline in market expenditure can be large. For example, Laitner
and Silverman [2006] ﬁnd average pre—retirement earnings for HRS couples to be about
$35,000 (in 1984 dollars) and average expenditures to be about $40,000 (including, as we
do here, service ﬂows from owner—occupied houses and medical spending). With male
earnings alone, the drop in average household expenditure at retirement would slightly
exceed $5,000, about 12.5 percent of average expenditures. With male and female earnings
in a ratio 2:1, the fall would be $7,000, about 17.5 percent of pre—retirement consumption.
These ﬁgures match the “consumption puzzle” declines in the cited literature.
It is fair to note that our estimation stra t e g yu s e s–a n de v e nr e l i e su p o n–t h e
magnitude of the empirical fall in household expenditures at retirement in deriving its
estimates for Tables 2-4. We cannot, therefore, employ the same evidence to test our model
against alternative explanations for the decline. On the other hand, one can say that our
theoretical model is consistent with the empirical decline, and that parameter estimates
based on the assumption that home production explains the entire decline are plausible in
the sense that they obey our anticipations in (7) and yield labor—supply elasticities similar
to those in the existing literature. We hope that our explicit theoretical modeling will aid
17future work in developing tests of alternative hypotheses about consumption changes at
retirement.
Euler Equations. A very large literature studies Euler—equation models that relate a
household’s consumption at diﬀerent ages (e.g., Hall [1978, 1988], Hansen and Sin-
gleton [1982, 1983], Campbell and Mankiw [1989, 1991], Shapiro [1984], Altonji and
Siow [1987], and many others]. Although we derive a certainly equivalent Euler equation
from Proposition 1, many papers allow the greater generality of a stochastic environment.8
However, most of the existing literature omits home production. When ∆ =1i n( 3 1 ) ,
omitting home production would leave
xi,s+1 = ci,s+1 = e
r−ρ
1−γ · cis = e
r−ρ
1−γ · xis . (34)















and similarly for ci,s+1. Tables 2-4 present Wald tests of the hypothesis
H0 : θm =0=θf .
Under H0, (34) and (21) would be identical. But, the tests reject – at the 1 percent
signiﬁcance level in columns 2-3. Given positive values for θf and/or θm,t h en o v e lt e r m s
in (21) can easily become quite large.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, the Consumer Expenditure Sur-
vey, and the Current Population Survey, we estimate key parameters of a life—cycle model
with home production. The estimates indicate that the value of forgone home production
for working men is fairly modest – roughly 10-15 cents for every dollar that a married
man earns in the formal labor market. The value of forgone home production for mar-
ried, working women seems substantially larger, perhaps 30-35 cents per dollar of market
earnings.
Our ﬁndings have implications for the study of several aspects of household economic
activity and retirement behavior. First, our parameter estimates suggest that male labor
supply elasticities should be quite low compared to those for married females. Speciﬁcally,
the point estimates suggest that the male elasticity should be roughly 0.10-0.20 while the
female elasticity should be 0.50-0.55. Other papers emphasize tradeoﬀs between home
and market work as a potential source of business—cycle variation in measured production.
Although our results conﬁrm the existence of such a margin, they suggest that it may
8 Recall our discussion of time dummies in Section 4.
18be of limited importance in practice for understanding sizeable labor supply responses,
especially for men.
Second, several researchers have suggested that households may reduce their market
expenditures at retirement because of enhanced opportunities thereafter for home pro-
duction. We provide an explicit model of this potentiality and show that corresponding
parameter estimates are plausible in several respects.
Finally, our ﬁndings have implications for the academic literature on intertemporal
allocation. Many papers use the Euler—equation approach of Hall [1978] to test the opti-
mality of consumption decisions. Our result ss u g g e s tt h a tt h e s et e s t sm a yb em i s s p e c i ﬁed
if their estimation equation omits home production.
19Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: For convenience, drop the household index i.L e t Ij =
[sj−1 ,s j),j=1 ,...,J − 1, and [sJ−1 ,s J],w i t hs0 = S, sJ−1 = R and sJ = T.W e
separately solve the optimization problem (1) on each interval Ij and then prove that
t h ec o - s t a t ev a r i a b l ei sc o n t i n u o u sa tp o i n t ssj. Consider a subproblem of (1) on
an interval Ij where Ns, As, ym
s , wf
s are all continuous, which makes it a standard
optimal control problem. We can eliminate xs by substituting (2) into (3) which gives






















− cs.( 3 0 )
Since the ﬁxed cost has no eﬀect upon marginal conditions for optimization, we write
a Hamiltonian for this problem as































Assume that Ij is such that hf


















































= ρ − r, (34)
λs ≥ 0 and λs · as =0 . (35)
If Ij is such that hf
s =0 ,( 3 2 )i sr e p l a c e db yhf
s =0(and similarly for hm
s ).
Now we establish continuity of λs by induction. Take the last interval of life IJ.( 3 1 )
shows that λs > 0.T h e n ( 3 5 ) i m p l i e s t h a t asJ =0 . T h e r e f o r e ,w ec a ns o l v et h e
boundary value problem for the system of equations (30)-(34) for any initial value




denote the maximized criterion over the interval IJ.
Observe that ϕ(·) is a diﬀerentiable function.















This is a standard problem (e.g. Kamien and Schwartz, p. 153) that has the ﬁrst















Thus λs is continuous at s = sJ−1. Induction over j establishes continuity of λs on
[S,T].
Since λs > 0, ∂H
∂h
f
s =0immediately implies (9)-(10), and when hf
s =0 ,( 9 ) - ( 1 0 )a l s o
trivially hold.
Therefore, the ﬁrst order conditions (31)-(34) apply on the whole interval [S,T].
Solving (34) on [S,T] and substituting the result into (31) gives




1−γs.( 3 6 )
S i n c eb o t ht h eo b j e c t i v ef u n c t i o na n dt h el a wo fm o t i o na r ec o n c a v ei nt h es t a t ea n d
control variables, the ﬁrst order conditions are suﬃcient for a maximum with respect
to cs for any given time path of hm
s and hf
s.
The value of c∗ ≡ (λ0)
1







































Proof of Proposition 2: Drop the household index i and ﬁx s ≥ R,U s i n gt h e













Moreover, Proposition 1 showed that aT =0 . Then integrating (3) from s to T and
noting that (hm
s = hf
















On the other hand, intergrating (3) from S to T,a n du s i n g( 9 ) ,( 1 0 )a n dt h ed e ﬁnition
of Y M
s and Y F
s we have










































































−rt · ct dt.














−rt · ct dt.


















Taking the ratio of (37) to (38), and multiplying the numerator and denominator of
the ratio in the right hand side by σ−s leads to (13).
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